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CHALLENGES OF THE NEW ECONOMY:
ISSUES AT THE INTERSECTION OF ANTITRUST
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ROBERT PITOFSKY*

There is wide agreement that the last decade or so has presented an
unusually lively and challenging period for antitrust analysis. Among
many reasons we can point to are deregulation and problems of transition
to a free market (telecommunications and electricity production offer
leading examples), developments in procedural cooperation and possible substantive convergence in response to the increasing globalization
of competition and enforcement approaches, and priorities in addressing
an unprecedented merger wave.
An additional challenge involves the application of established antitrust principles to the growing high-tech sector of the economy. It is
that application of antitrust law to the new economy, and particularly
the relationship between antitrust and intellectual property, that I will
address here.

A.

THE NEW ECONOMY CHALLENGE

Of late, we hear increasing concern that the century-old Sherman Act
cannot keep up with the more dynamic and fast-moving developments
of the 21st century. A New York Times editorial earlier this year frames
the issue: "Can, and should, laws designed to manage the emergence of
industrial and natural resource monopolies in the late 19th and early
20th Centuries be applied to the technology and intellectual property
giants of the 21st Century?"l
Advocates of a negative answer, according to a similar chain of logic,
might argue that the First Amendment, a hundred years older than the

* Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. This essay is a slightly amended
version of remarks delivered on June 15, 2000, at a conference held by the American
Antitrust Institute entitled, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century. The views
expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or other
Commissioners. I want to thank Michael McFalls for his valuable contributions to this essay.
1 The Remedy for Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at A22.
913
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Sherman Act, should not influence state regulation of media because
the Internet and cable television are so different from distribution of
Federalist pamphlets. We do not hear that argument made nearly as
often. In both cases, the issue ought to be whether core principles are
still valid, not when those principles were adopted. And just as free
speech remains central to our democratic political system, competitionand antitrust enforcement-are fundamental to continuing economic
growth.

B.

CORE PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST

Antitrust is concerned primarily with cartels and the acqulSltlOn or
maintenance of monopoly power by unacceptable means. Most (but
not all) of the rest of antitrust is collateral to those two principles. 2
To illustrate:
(1) Mergers in general, and the remarkable merger wave of the last
eight years in particular, may be problematic when they are likely
to lead to concentration that facilitates collusion, or lead directly
to dominant market power. 3
(2) Predatory and exclusionary conduct are of most concern when
they achieve, maintain, or create a dangerous probability of
monopoly power. 4
(3) Boycotts are most likely to be challenged when they contribute
to maintaining a cartel or to monopoly power. 5
(4) Minimum resale price maintenance is treated aggressively because
it may be a facilitating practice for cartel behavior among sellers
or a direct cartel arrangement among dealers. 6
2 In emphasizing avoidance of cartels and containment of illegal monopoly powerconcepts derived from economic Iiterature-I do not mean to suggest that the reasons
for hostility to cartels and illegal monopolies are exclusively economic, or that the antitrust
laws be interpreted solely with economic goals in mind. On the contrary, concentrated
market power can impair individual and business freedom and, depending on the sector
of the economy in which it occurs, can on occasion threaten democratic values that require
dispersion of economic power. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127
U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979).
g U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 (1992, revised 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,104.
4 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
5 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
6 Continental T.v., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977).
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In many respects the most important development in antitrust analysis
under American law, particularly relevant in a discussion of the relationship between antitrust and intellectual property, is the increased willingness of enforcement authorities and courts to take efficiencies into
account as a mitigating factor. Efficiency claims have been acknowledged
in enforcement against monopolies under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act? and cartel enforcement,8 while the role of efficiencies as a mitigating
factor has been clarified and arguably expanded in connection with
merger enforcement. 9
There are exceptions of course to antitrust enforcement's focus on
cartel and monopoly concerns, and special attention to efficiencies.
For example, the Robinson-Patman Act, and particularly older cases
interpreting that statute, is concerned with the buying power of large
chains unfairly diminishing commercial opportunities for small business.
An titrust rules against tie-in sales derive at least in part from an unwillingness to see consumers coerced into purchases they do not want to make. lO
Finally, there are some boycotts and refusals to deal that have anticompetitive effects, and are so lacking in business justification, that they
are challenged without regard to a direct effect on cartel behavior or
monopoly power. ll
C. CORE ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THE HIGH-TECH SECTOR

Assuming the core principles of antitrust are still valid, why should
they be abandoned when applied to the high-tech sector of the economy?
Three arguments have been advanced.
1. Durability of Market Power
It is often argued that the high-tech sector of the American economy
is so dynamic that cartels and monopoly power will be short-lived. They
will be defeated more quickly and efficiently by market forces, such as
new entry, than by any band of bureaucrats. Moreover, government
7 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) acknowledging
a superior skill foresight and industry defense to a charge of monopolization.
S See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (including analysis of efficiencies in deciding between per se or rule of reason treatment of cartel behavior).
9 Revision to the U.S. Department ofJustice and FTC Joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(1997), supra note 3.
10 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,6 (1958).
II FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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regulation is likely to make more, and longer-lasting, mistakes than
the market. 12
a. Response
While barriers to entry may often be lower in high-tech sectors, partly
because successful entry so often depends on new ideas, those barriers
can nevertheless be substantial. The systems designed to encourage and
protect innovation-patents and copyrights-can be, and often are, used
to barricade a market against entry by new rivals.
Another barrier to entry that appears to occur more frequently in
high-tech sectors involves network effects. Network effects, also known
as positive network externalities, arise when the value of a network
increases with the number of its users. A single firm, perhaps because
it is the first mover, becomes or threatens to become the only supplier
of certain products or services because of the value of compatibility or
interoperability. Consumers are more likely to remain with the established network because of their sunk costs (sometimes referred to as
"lock-in") and suppliers of complementary products will tailor those
products to the established network and resist preparing products for
would-be challengers. In that event, network dominance itself becomes
a formidable barrier to entry. Also, high-tech industries are no different
than others in the sense that "brand-name recognition" and reputation
for reliability can create virtually insurmountable advantages for incumbents. Finally, practices illegal under the antitrust laws, such as price
discrimination, exclusionary contracts, or intimidation tactics available
only to very large firms, can themselves impede entry by more efficient challengers.
None of this questions the more basic point that it is easier to become
an applications programmer and grow from that base than to design,
finance, and construct a steel factory. But barriers to entry can and do
exist in the high-tech sector, and companies can retain market advantages
for decades or even longer. One cannot assume that the market invariably
will succeed in dissipating entrenched market power in an acceptable
time frame or that superior products will displace inferior products that
enjoy first-mover advantages.
2. Protecting Incentives to Innovate
Another argument is that a little (or perhaps a good deal of) market
power is a good thing because it creates prospects for profits that increase
12 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 15 (1984) ("[TJhe
economic system corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects judicial errors. There

HeinOnline -- 68 Antitrust L.J. 916 2000-2001

2001]

CHALLENGES OF THE NEW ECONOMY

917

incentives to innovate, which, long term, is more important to consumers
than price competition. Because effects on incentives to innovate are
hard to measure, government should pursue a cautious or perhaps even
a hands-off policy.
a. Response
The better view is that both antitrust, by protecting competition, and
intellectual property, by rewarding innovation, create incentives to introduce new products. In addition, antitrust for the most part has no quarrel
with the argument that market power is more acceptable if it is reasonably
necessary to achieve efficiencies, including efficiencies connected with
innovation. When modest anticompetitive effects of a transaction are
significantly outweighed by the positive consumer welfare consequences
of innovation, antitrust has historically struck the balance in favor of
innovation. A few examples illustrate the point.
Research and development joint ventures are a classic example of
arrangements that may lessen short-term competition to innovate and
yet may have long-term procompetitive and pro-consumer effects. Since
the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, there has been exactly one
federal government challenge to a research joint venture l3-an example
of caution in interfering with private arrangements to innovate that
would be hard to beat.
When competitors control patents that include legitimate conflicting
claims, so that each patent holder is blocked from bringing a superior,
non-infringing product to the market, the courts consistently have
allowed cross-licenses, even when the cross-licenses incorporated agreements on price l4 or where the combination of blocking patents had
dominant or even monopoly power. 15
Occasionally access to information about a monopolist's product is
essential for manufacturers of collateral products or services to compete
effectively in the market. Courts have fairly consistently held, however,
that there is no obligation to predisclose, even by a monopolist, because,
among other reasons, any such duty would tend to discourage aggressive
competition in innovation. 16
is no automatic way to expunge mistaken decisions of the Supreme Court. A practice
once condemned is likely to stay condemned, no matter its benefits.")
IS Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd sub.
nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
14 See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
15 See Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550, 569-71 (4th Cir. 1950).
16 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F. 2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979) ("If a
firm that has engaged in the risks and expenses of research and development were required
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Evidence of an intent to avoid unnecessary interference with incentives
to innovate is found throughout the FTC/DOJ Antitrust Guidelines
for Collaborations Among Competitors, issued in 2000. For example,
discussion of research and development collaboration is introduced with
the following language: "Most such agreements are pro-competitive,
and they typically are analyzed under the rule of reason. Through the
combination of complementary assets, technology, or know-how, an R&D
collaboration may enable participants more quickly or more efficiently
to research and develop new or improved goods, services, or production processes."17
Undoubtedly, there have been instances where an excessive concern
to protect rivalry has inappropriately outweighed regard for innovationthe rather formalistic "Nine No-No's" of the 1970s is probably an exampie IS-but the overall trend in antitrust enforcement has been solicitous
of innovation.
3. High-Tech Industries Operate in Ways that Are
Unprecedented in Industrial Economies

A third claim is that antitrust and economics have focused mostly on
static price analysis, but dynamic innovation competition is different and
will benefit consumers. For example, prices often fall rather than increase
with market power in high-tech industries. Non-high-tech lawyers and
economists will never get it.
a. Response
It may be that the conventional notion that competition is always a
stimulant and monopoly is always a narcoticI 9 does not apply in exactly
the same way in high-tech industries, and perhaps new models of analysis
are called for. It is true that successful high-tech companies are often
aggressive in price and innovation, but competition is still important, if
in all circumstances to share with its rivals the benefits of those endeavors, this incentive
[to innovate] would very likely be vitiated. Withholding from others advance knowledge
of one's new products, therefore, ordinarily constitutes valid competitive conduct. ").
17 Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.31 (a) (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
20001041 ftcdojguidelines. pdf.
18 For a description of the "Nine No-No's," see Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg,
Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST LJ.
167,178-84 (1998).
19 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Many
people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative and
depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant,
to industrial progress; that the spurs of constant stress is necessary to counteract an
inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.").
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only because it is likely that consumers would be better off with two or
three aggressive companies, assuming the market can support more than
one, rather than a single dominant firm. Indeed, competition may be
especially important where innovation is concerned, in order to preserve
a diversity of approaches which will often prove essential to advance
knowledge and discovery. The history of innovation since the monolithic
AT&T was broken up is some evidence that innovation is more likely to
thrive in the presence of competition than in its absence.
D.

HAS THE ANTITRUST-IP BALANCE CHANGED?

To summarize to this point, the history of the last 110 years has treated
antitrust and intellectual property as complementary regimes, both
designed to encourage innovation within appropriate limits. As a matter
of policy, we are comfortable rewarding innovation through patents and
copyrights so long as the compensation is not significantly in excess of
that necessary to encourage investment in innovation, and the market
power that results is not used to distort competition in, for example,
related product or service areas. But because intellectual property is now
a principal, if not the principal, barrier to new entry in high-tech markets,
we are also concerned that it be interpreted in a way that does not distort
the traditional balance between intellectual property and antitrust.
I am concerned that recent cases, and particularly the Federal Circuit's
opinion in Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (Xerox) ,20
have upset that traditional balance in a way that has disturbing implications for the future of antitrust in high-technology industries.
In Xerox, a group of independent service organizations (ISOs) in the
business of servicing high-speed copiers and printers alleged that Xerox's
refusal to sell or license replacement parts and diagnostic software to
ISOs precluded them from competing effectively against Xerox in the
service aftermarket. Obviously, the issue before the court was very similar
to that considered by the Supreme Court in 1992 in Kodak,21 where ISOs
challenged Kodak policies designed to limit the availability of parts to
ISOs and to make it more difficult for ISOs to compete with Kodak in
servicing Kodak equipment. The Supreme Court concluded that Kodak's
policy of selling replacement parts for its machines only to buyers of
Kodak equipment who use Kodak service to repair the machine could
be an illegal tie-in sale, as well as a monopolization or an attempt to
monopolize the service and parts markets, and remanded for a trial on
20

21

203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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those issues. On remand, Kodak raised for the first time the argument
that its parts enjoyed patent and copyright protection,22 but the Ninth
Circuit rejected that defense on evidence that it was a pretext.
In the subsequent Xerox case, the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected
the Ninth Circuit's approach in Kodak, refusing to consider evidence
that the purpose and effect of Xerox's actions were anticompetitive.
Thus, the Federal Circuit wrote:
We see no more reason to inquire into the subjective motivation of
Xerox in refusing to sell or license its patented works than we found
in evaluating the subjective motivation of the patentee in bringing suit
to enforce that same right. In the absence of any illegal tying, fraud in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder
may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using
or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust
laws. We therefore will not inquire into his subjective motivation for
exerting his statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell or license
his patent invention may have an anti-competitive effect, so long as
that anti-competitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory
paten t gran t. 23

Although the plaintiffs in Xerox were prepared to show the discontinuance was introduced for an anticompetitive purpose, the Federal Circuit
nevertheless affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment
against the ISOs. Beyond the matter of result, the court reached its
decision in sweeping language that exalts patent and copyright rights
over other considerations and throws into doubt the validity of previous
lines of authority that attempted to strike a balance between intellectual
property and antitrust. 24
The Federal Circuit concluded that a patentee can refuse to license
or sell, and is immune under the antitrust laws for that refusal, unless
one of the following conditions applies:
(1) The patent was obtained by fraud on the PTO;

22 On remand, the ISOs dropped their tying claims against Kodak, contending that
Kodak's unilateral refusal to sell replacement parts violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1997).
23 203 F.3d at 1327-28.
24 For cases discussing the balance, see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d
Cir. 1981); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.h., 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir.
1981) See also Tom & Newberg, supra note 18, at 173-75 (describing evolution of balance
between antitrust and intellectual property); Louis Kaplow, The Patent Antitrust Intersection:
A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1984).
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(2) The suit to enforce the patent was "sham"-as that term was
defined by the Supreme Court in Professional Real Estate Investors;25 or
(3) The patent was used as part of a tie-in strategy to extend market

power beyond the legitimate confines of the patent grant. 26
Putting aside questions about the logic of these three exceptions to
absolute immunity for the patent holder,27 these appear to be extremely
narrow limits on a virtually unfettered right of a patent holder to refuse
to deal in order to achieve an anticompetitive objective. For example,
a claim that a patent was obtained by fraud on the PTO-a so-called
Walker Processclaim 28 -is more difficult to prove than almost any antitrust
allegation because the Federal Circuit requires clear evidence that a
patent applicant made knowing and willful misrepresentations that
resulted in a patent that would not have issued in the absence of a
misrepresentation. 29 With respect to sham litigation, the Supreme Court
has held that the litigant has an absolute defense if the plaintiff had an
objectively reasonable claim (regardless of any predatory motive), and
an objectively reasonable claim is defined as one where "no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits."30 Misuse of a
patent to coerce purchasers to take an unpatented separate product,
assuming the patent confers true market power, has long been thought
to be an illegal tie,3l but hardly exhausts the various situations in which
a patent can be misused with anticompetitive effect.
More important than the Xerox result itself, questions arise as to what
the Federal Circuit's approach portends-i.e., an approach that seems
to exalt protection of intellectual property rights-with respect to conProfessional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
Plaintiffs also challenged Xerox's policy of refusing to sell copyrighted manuals. The
Federal Circuit treated the policy as a unilateral refusal to sell intellectual property, and
reached much the same conclusions as those relating to patent issues. The copyright
portion of the opinion raises policy issues that are similar to the patent issues and, at least
in the context of this article, does not require separate discussion.
27 For example, if the plaintiff proved that the defendant had attempted to enforce an
invalid patent, as part of a Walker Process or sham litigation claim, then the defendant
would have no lawful patent to license and permissible limits of its refusal to do so would
be irreve\ant.
28 Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chern. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
29 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F. 3d 1059, 1070-71 (Fed. Cir.
1998); see also James B. Kobak, Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Hidden Choices
Between Original and Sequential Innovation, 3 VA.J.L. & TECH. 6 (1998).
30 See Professional Real t:State Investors, 508 U.S. at 60.
31 See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947).
25

26
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tinuing validity in the Federal Circuit of the long-standing balance
between antitrust and intellectual property. Let me be clear that I have
no quarrel with the fundamental rule that a patent holder has no obligation to license or sell in the first instance. A patent holder is not under
any general obligation to create competition against itself within the
scope of its patent. 32 But what will the rules be when the patent holder
conditions the availability of its patented products or inventions on
terms that affect competition? The Xerox opinion could be read to say
that the invocation of intellectual property rights settles the matter,
except in the three narrow situations described in the opinion, regardless
of the effect of the refusal to deal on competition or the importance of
the refusal to deal to protect incentives to innovate. That should not be
the way these issues are addressed.
Assume in each of the following situations that the patent reflects
substantial market power. How would the approach of the Federal Circuit
play out?
(1) Suppose a patent holder refuses to sell except on condition that
the purchaser not buy from a potential competitor. Assuming monopoly
power, that could be a violation under LorainJournal. 33 Would a patent
be an absolute defense because the product incorporates a patented
element?
(2) Suppose an inventor licensed an important process patent to five
firms in a traditional manufacturing sector. One of the firms is a price
cutter. If the inventor terminates the license, would Xerox preclude any
investigation into motive, or into the possibility that termination, though
unilateral, resulted from joint coercive action by the other licensees?34
(3) Suppose two firms have entered into a patent-pooling agreement
in which each firm retains veto power over the selection of its partner's
licensees. Would a unilateral refusal to license, designed to reduce competition below levels that would exist in the absence of the pooling

32 See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Where a
patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws
cannot trigger liability under the antitrust laws. ").
33 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951) (holding that a local
newspaper attempted to monopolize the market for local advertising by refusing to deal
with advertisers who dealt with a new local radio station).
34 Cj, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus. Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d
Cir. 1979) (noting that "the patent system has no interest in permitting the patentee's
monopoly to be used as a screen for the maintenance of a horizontal cartel at the licensee
level"); International Wood Processors v. Powder Dry Inc., 792 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1986).
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agreement, be protected activity, even if the pooling agreement led to
the refusal?35
(4) Suppose a patent holder knowingly misinformed a standardsetting organization that it had no patents in a particular area, and as
a result the organization developed a standard that required use of the
patent holder's patent. If the patent holder refused to license, or would
license only at exorbitant rates, would that be protected activity?36
Some might believe that these concerns about the sweeping language
of a particular decision are unwarranted or premature. I hope so. But
consider the recent district court decision in Townshend v. Rockwell International Corp.,37 where the owners of basic patents underlying the 56k
modem technology sued for patent infringement. The defendant, Rockwell, launched antitrust counterclaims alleging that the patents on which
the suit was based were invalid, the technology under the patents had
been adopted as part of an industry standard through fraud on a trade
association and its members, and the patents were made available to
competitors only on condition that they cross-license their technology
to the patent holder. The district court dismissed the three antitrust
claims, concluding in part that "[b]ecause a patent owner has the legal
right to refuse to license his or her patent on any terms, the existence of
a predicate condition to a license agreement cannot violate the antitrust
laws."38 Among the authorities cited for that and other conclusions is
the Federal Circuit's Xerox opinion. 39
CONCLUSION

It is important for people concerned about incentives to produce
intellectual property and people concerned about antitrust to engage
constructively. The Federal Circuit's overall attentiveness to preserving
incentives to innovate makes sense, particularly in an economy that
depends more and more on innovation to advance consumer welfare.
Nevertheless, the broader implications of the Xerox decision are troubling. Traditionally, cases at the intersection between intellectual prop35 See, e.g., United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184,201-02 (E.D. Pa. 1956), affd per
curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 311 (E.D.
Mich. 1951), affd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
36 These issues arose in a recent enforcement action against Dell Computer. See Dell

Computer Corp., C-3658 (FTC May 20, 1996) (consent order).
37 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5070 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2000).
38 Id at *26.
39Id. at *23 ("Given that a patent holder is permitted under the antitrust laws to
completely exclude others from practicing his or her technology," 3 Com's proposed
licensing terms were not antitrust violations.).
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erty and antitrust have been analyzed by examining the impact on
economic incentives to innovate and balancing them against anticompetitive effects. As I tried to point out earlier, that balance usually (though
perhaps not always) has been accomplished with great respect for and
concern about protecting incentives to innovate. The newer approach,
focusing only on a statutory right to exclude, appears to depart from
that tradition.
An approach that starts from the point that a patent holder does not
have to sell or license to anyone, and proceeds from that unchallenged
assumption to the rule that it therefore can condition its sales or licenses
in any way it sees fit (with tie-in sales as the sole antitrust exception),
would be an unwise and unfortunate departure from the traditional
approach in this area. I question whether there is reason to believe any
such interpretation is necessary to encourage the innovation process.
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